Now showing items 1-6 of 6
Optimality of linearity with collusion and renegotiation
(Elsevier Science Bv, 2014-09)
This study analyzes a continuous-time N-agent Brownian moral hazard model with constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utilities, in which agents' actions jointly determine the mean and variance of the outcome process. In ...
Truth-telling and trust in sender-receiver games with intervention: an experimental study
(Springer Heidelberg, 2014-06)
Recent experimental studies find excessive truth-telling in sender-receiver games. We show that this phenomenon is robust to the random intervention of a truthful regulator. In addition, intervention significantly increases ...
Disappearance of reputations in two-sided incomplete-information games
(Academic Press Inc Elsevier Science, 2014-11)
This paper examines the sustainability of reputations in a class of games with imperfect public monitoring and two long-lived players, both of whom have private information about their own type and uncertainty over the ...
A survey of strategic communication and persuasion
(Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, 2016-06)
This survey paper presents an extended literature review of strategic communication and persuasion. The goal is to provide a systematic categorization of the different approaches in the literature, accompanied with the ...
Arabuluculuk kuramı üzerine ekonomik bir yaklaşım, Eksik bilgi kaynaklı çatışma çözümünde etkin arabuluculuk: taraflı ya da tarafsız?
(EYD Ekonomik Yaklaşım Derneği, 2016-04)
Many papers studying mediation in conflict resolution focuses on mediator characteristics as unbiased vs. biased. Some emphasize the necessity of unbiasedness, while others argue that only biased mediators can play an ...
The Optimality of Team Contracts
This paper analyzes optimal contracts in a linear hidden-action model with normally distributed returns possessing two moments that are governed jointly by two agents who have negative exponential utilities. They can observe ...