Now showing items 1-3 of 3
Disappearance of reputations in two-sided incomplete-information games
(Academic Press Inc Elsevier Science, 2014-11)
This paper examines the sustainability of reputations in a class of games with imperfect public monitoring and two long-lived players, both of whom have private information about their own type and uncertainty over the ...
Optimality of linearity with collusion and renegotiation
(Elsevier Science Bv, 2014-09)
This study analyzes a continuous-time N-agent Brownian moral hazard model with constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utilities, in which agents' actions jointly determine the mean and variance of the outcome process. In ...
Truth-telling and trust in sender-receiver games with intervention: an experimental study
(Springer Heidelberg, 2014-06)
Recent experimental studies find excessive truth-telling in sender-receiver games. We show that this phenomenon is robust to the random intervention of a truthful regulator. In addition, intervention significantly increases ...