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dc.contributor.authorÖzdoğan, Ayça
dc.date.accessioned2020-09-18T05:46:41Z
dc.date.available2020-09-18T05:46:41Z
dc.date.issued2016-10
dc.identifier.citationÖzdog?an, A. (2016). Occurrence of Deception Under the Oversight of a Regulator Having Reputation Concerns. In Recent Advances in Game Theory and Applications (pp. 185-200). Birkhäuser, Cham.en_US
dc.identifier.isbn9783319438375
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-43838-2_10
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/3732
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies deceptions conducted by agents in the presence of a regulator. The regulator is supposed to detect deviations from the “rightful” behavior through costly monitoring; thus she may not choose to be diligent in her job because of the associated costs. The goal is to understand the occurrence of deceptions when the interaction of the parties is not contractible, their behavior is not observable and the regulator has reputation concern for being perceived as diligent in a repeated incomplete-information setting. It is found that when the regulator faces a sequence of myopic agents, her payoff at any Nash equilibrium converges to the maximum payoff as the discount factor approaches to one for any prior belief on the regulator’s type. This suggests that, contrary to the well-known disappearance of reputation results in the literature, the reputation of the regulator for being diligent persists in the long-run in any equilibrium. These findings imply that socially undesirable behavior of the agents could be prevented through reputation concerns in this repeated setting.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherBirkhauseren_US
dc.relation.ispartofStatic and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applicationsen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
dc.subjectRegulationen_US
dc.subjectReputationen_US
dc.subjectRepeated gamesen_US
dc.subjectInspection gamesen_US
dc.subjectShort-lived agentsen_US
dc.titleOccurrence of deception under the oversight of a regulator having reputation concernsen_US
dc.typebookParten_US
dc.contributor.departmentTOBB ETU, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of Economicsen_US
dc.contributor.departmentTOBB ETÜ, İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi, İktisat Bölümütr_TR
dc.identifier.startpage185
dc.identifier.endpage200
dc.relation.tubitakinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/TÜBİTAK/SOBAG/115K567en_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85060250727
dc.contributor.tobbetuauthorÖzdoğan Atabay, Ayça
dc.contributor.YOKid182115
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/978-3-319-43838-2_10
dc.relation.publicationcategoryKitap Bölümü - Uluslararasıtr_TR


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